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Abstract: Conceptual engineering is thought to face an ‘implementation chal-
lenge’: the challenge of securing uptake of engineered concepts. But is the fact that
implementation is challenging really a defect to be overcome? What kind of pic-
ture of political life would be implied by making engineering easy to implement?
We contend that the ambition to obviate the implementation challenge goes
against the very idea of liberal democratic politics. On the picture we draw, the
implementation challenge can be overcome by institutionalizing control over
conceptual uptake, and there are contexts – such as professions that depend on
coordinated conceptual innovation – in which there are good reasons to institu-
tionalize control in this fashion. But the liberal fear of this power to control con-
ceptual uptake ending up in the wrong hands, combined with the democratic
demand for freedom of thought as a precondition of genuine consent, yields a lib-
eral democratic rationale for keeping implementation challenging.
1. Introduction
Conceptual engineering, with its ambition not merely to analyze, but to as-
sess and alter people’s concepts, is intimately tied up with issues in political
philosophy. It takes on the burden of determining what counts as an ‘im-
provement’ to our conceptual repertoire, and who gets to decide. These
questions have a political dimension, and rapidly lead into questions about
the distribution of power and authority.1 Once these political undertones
of the project of engineering people’s concepts are heard, the phrase
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‘conceptual engineering’ can acquire a sinister ring, and it becomes clear that
something needs to be said to mark it off from totalitarian thought control
(it was, after all, Stalin who, in a speech on the role of Soviet writers, hailed
them as ‘engineers of human souls’).2 Yet these political dimensions of con-
ceptual engineering have so far remained comparatively under-explored in a
field predominantly informed by the philosophy of language and mind.3
In this paper, we propose to examine the productive intersections between
conceptual engineering and political philosophy in connection with ‘the im-
plementation challenge’ that has recently been at the forefront of the concep-
tual engineering literature:4 the challenge of how to implement a piece of
ameliorative conceptual engineering, that is, of how to recruit people into
using a concept that would improve their conceptual repertoire. Opinions
differ on how serious the implementation challenge is. One prominent view
is that no individual or group has any significant degree of control over how
conceptual change happens, but that even if we have reason to regard con-
ceptual engineering efforts as futile, we should keep trying (an attitude rem-
iniscent of Antonio Gramsci’s injunction that we should combine
‘pessimism of the intellect with optimism of the will’).5 Others have argued
that we have some control over concepts through our control over speaker
meaning, or that we at least have the kind of collective long-term control
over concepts that we have over the climate.6 Whether or not we have con-
trol over concepts themselves, however, an underlying assumption shared by
many different views – which is arguably implicit already in the framing of
conceptual engineering as facing an implementation ‘challenge’ – is that lack
of control over conceptual uptake, that is, over which concepts people in fact
come to use, is a regrettable shortcoming.
But is it a shortcoming? What kind of picture of political life would be im-
plied by our managing to fully obviate the implementation challenge? That
is not merely a fanciful hypothetical scenario. We argue that the implemen-
tation challenge could in fact be fully overcome by institutionalizing mecha-
nisms that coordinate and enforce uptake. The extent of anyone’s control
over conceptual uptake is itself something we can collectively control, and
hence something that continuously and properly forms an object of political
debate.
Against this backdrop, we then explore the political implications of insti-
tutionalizing the power easily to secure the uptake of any given concept, in
the sense of being able not just to prescribe, but to enforce its quick uptake.
Our contention will be that this could only be achieved in a way that goes
against the very idea of liberal democratic politics, because there are inher-
ent tensions between the ambition to overcome the implementation chal-
lenge and the ideals of liberal democracy. From these tensions, we draw a
two-pronged liberal democratic rationale for making and keeping the imple-
mentation of conceptual engineering challenging.
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First, we argue that the power effectively to implement conceptual engi-
neering projects, however ameliorative, across a society’s conceptual reper-
toire is incompatible with that society being a liberal society, in the
undemanding sense of ‘liberal’ that Judith Shklar has spelled out under the
heading of ‘the liberalism of fear’: A liberal society, in this sense, avoids un-
checked concentrations of power to protect the less powerful against abuses
of power by the more powerful, and the power to control the conceptual rep-
ertoire is just too open to such abuses to be compatible with liberalism. Even
if we think that our conceptual repertoire needs revising and are confident
that the power to control it would initially be used well, we have a pro tanto
reason to relent from creating such a power for fear that it might be abused
in the long run. This is the liberal rationale for keeping conceptual engineer-
ing hard to implement.
Second, we argue that the power effectively to implement conceptual en-
gineering projects across a society’s conceptual repertoire is incompatible
with that society being a democracy. Democratic rule requires the consent
of the governed. But giving any actor (either the state directly, or, in more
complex cases, some private actor) the power to engineer concepts across
the board is to give it the power to engineer consent, in particular by engi-
neering the concepts of legitimacy on which consent depends. Because
engineered consent is not real consent, limiting control over concepts must
be part of what makes a society genuinely democratic: it ensures that demo-
cratic input does not lapse from being an effective constraint on power to be-
ing amere effect of it. This is the democratic rationale for keeping conceptual
engineering hard to implement.
Yet we also qualify our argument in two significant respects. To bring out
the tensions between the ambition to overcome the implementation chal-
lenge and the ideals of liberalism and democracy, we focus, for the sake of
clarity and vividness, on the consequences of fully overcoming that chal-
lenge. But there is of course a spectrum here: One might make conceptual
engineering only marginally easier to implement at the cost of making soci-
ety only marginally less liberal and democratic, and, for all that our argu-
ment requires, there might be compelling reasons in favor of accepting
that trade-off. Our liberal democratic rationale for forswearing control is
only meant to yield pro tanto reasons conditional on endorsing certain lib-
eral democratic ideals, not pro toto reasons.What makes for an optimal rest-
ing point on that spectrum of trade-offs is a political question, not something
that can be specified from the armchair. But the systematic tension that gives
rise to these trade-offs, that is, the tension at the level of principle, can be rec-
ognized from there, and it is in virtue of this systematic tension that our point
against institutionalizing control over conceptual uptake holds not just for
the limiting case, but more widely, its force shading off along the spectrum
of control.
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What will also become evident from the armchair, moreover – and this is
the second qualification – is that there are specific contexts, such as profes-
sions that depend on regular and coordinated conceptual innovation, in
which there are good reasons to institutionalize control over conceptual up-
take. If done right, this can be locally achieved without undermining a
society’s liberal democratic credentials.
Outside of these special contexts, however, there is a liberal democratic ra-
tionale for ensuring that the implementation challenge remains challenging:
So far from being a regrettable flaw, lack of control over conceptual uptake
is a doubly essential feature of liberal democratic society. A society could not
completely eliminate that feature without sacrificing both what made it lib-
eral and what made it democratic.
2. Controlling control
Richard (2020, p. 365) has compared the engineering of a new concept to the
introduction of a new allele into a genetic population, an allele whichmay or
may not go on to replicate, spread, and come to dominate in that
population.7 The analogy is richly suggestive and apt in many respects,
but it invites us into a perspective from which the conceptual engineer has
no control whatsoever over the uptake of a concept. The engineer can only
lower the concept into the swirling waters of cultural evolution and hope,
like a helpless castaway sending a message in a bottle, that the currents will
be favorable.
This perspective on conceptual engineering renders it tempting to underes-
timate the extent to which we can influence which concepts win out, how-
ever. For one thing, even on the terms of Richard’s allele analogy, it is
important to remember that we can influence the natural environment to fa-
vor the propagation of certain alleles over others. A classic example is indus-
trial melanism, whereby factory soot darkens the natural environment and
thereby favors melanic alleles that darken body tissue and lead to better
camouflage. The spread of the dark-colored peppered moth is an evolution-
ary adaption to a human intervention in the natural environment: the indus-
trial revolutionmade light-colored pepperedmoths stand out against trees in
heavily coal-polluted areas, turning them into easy prey for birds; as a result,
selective predation drove up the frequency of melanic alleles.8 By analogy to
industrial melanism, Simion and Kelp (2020) have argued that we can pur-
posefully generate new adaptive pressures on concepts by changing the so-
cial and cultural context in which they are deployed.
Yet control over which concepts people use can become even more direct.
It is possible to institutionalize mechanisms that catalyze or even come close
to guaranteeing the uptake and enforcement of conceptual innovations.
Authority over which concepts are to be used in a community of concept-
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users, such as a profession, can be centralized, and the processes of educa-
tion, training, and continued admission and advancement in that commu-
nity can be hierarchically organized and tightly regimented. We find such
regimented, centralized, and hierarchical practices ensuring control over cer-
tain concepts in the medical profession, for instance, where much depends
on two doctors understanding the same thing by a given medical term,
and there are strong practical imperatives to establish and maintain a high
degree of coordination and homogeneity within the conceptual repertoire
in use at any given time. TheWorldHealthOrganization publishes the Inter-
national Classification of Diseases (ICD) and revises it at regular intervals,
for example, thereby facilitating coordinated conceptual innovation be-
tween clinicians, lawyers, policymakers, regulatory agencies, the pharma-
ceutical industry, and health insurance companies.
Similarly, the legal profession has quite sophisticated tools to ensure that it
has some control over its operative concepts: Authority over what concepts
should be used is centralized within a jurisdiction, and the recognition of that
authority is itself regimented, hierarchically organized, and supported by an
educational apparatus providing extensive legal training in prevailing con-
ceptual norms and in the norms by which concepts are revised. These insti-
tutionalized uptake and enforcement mechanisms are designed to ensure
that legal concepts retain not just a high degree of uniformity within a juris-
diction, but also a strong responsiveness to conceptual innovation from cen-
tralized authoritative sources.
The extent to which there are such institutionalizedmechanisms of control
over conceptual uptake is a matter of the extent to which a society collec-
tively decides to institutionalize such mechanisms. How much control there
is over conceptual uptake is not simply something to be discovered, the way
one might discover that human immune systems vary regionally, formed by
localized exposure to pathogens. It is itself something societies have some
control over, which makes it a political question about the shape those soci-
eties should take, and about how the power of the state should be deployed
in this connection. In other words, how much control someone has over a
concept’s uptake is a politically malleable parameter that is responsive to col-
lective deliberation and coordination about how far to institutionalize mech-
anisms designed to facilitate control over conceptual uptake. Even if it is true
that we now largely lack such control, therefore, it does not follow that we
could not change that.
Accordingly, the set of concepts at work in a society is better compared,
for our purposes, with something socially constructed rather than biologi-
cally given; it is less like an autonomously evolving population of alleles,
and more like a marketplace of ideas – an analogy that renders far more sa-
lient the possibility that wemight (paceMill) make it into a tightly controlled
market if we onlymuster the political will to do so. The sense in which we, as
a liberal democratic collective, control the extent of anyone’s control over
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conceptual uptake is through our collective ability to decide to institutional-
ize such control. The question we now turn to is the question of the advis-
ability of such institutionalized control.
3. A liberal democratic rationale for forswearing control
Is a lack of control over conceptual uptake really a flaw to be remedied?We
noted that how much control we have over which concepts people use is a
politicallymalleable parameter. But it is not malleable to the point that a lib-
eral democratic society could decide to institutionalize conceptual imple-
mentation mechanisms across all domains of life and still remain a liberal
democratic society. The total obviation of the implementation challenge im-
plies a radically different picture of the state and civil society which is itself
radically anti-liberal and anti-democratic. In this section, we develop a
two-pronged liberal democratic rationale for forswearing control over the
implementation of conceptual engineering, with the first prong emphasizing
the ‘liberal’ half and the second the ‘democratic’ half of the idea of a liberal
democratic society.
3.1. CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR
The first prong of the rationale – let us call it the liberal rationale – adapts to
the topic of conceptual engineering an argument that Judith Shklar has
made under the heading of the ‘liberalism of fear’ (1989). The upshot of
the argument will be that institutionalizing the power effectively to imple-
ment conceptual engineering across a society’s conceptual repertoire is in-
compatible with that society being, in Shklar’s sense, a liberal society.
To see what the fear in question is a fear of, in this context, we must start
from the basic point that conceptual engineering can be deteriorative as well
as ameliorative, that is, make things worse rather than better, and that we
have reason to fear what seem to us deteriorative changes in the conceptual
repertoire.9
Deteriorative conceptual engineering has long been a central topic of dys-
topian and minatory fictions. George Orwell’s fictitious language
‘Newspeak,’ carefully engineered to be a tool of oppression, is perhaps the
best-known example. In an appendix on ‘Newspeak,’ Orwell meditates on
how expunging all traces of the political concept of equality from the word
‘equality’ would turn the statement ‘all men are equal’ into ‘a palpable un-
truth – i.e. that all men are of equal size, weight, or strength’ (Orwell 1981,
p. 255).10 Another powerful image of what the fully centralized and con-
trolled manipulation of all kinds of concepts might actually look like is
painted by Aldous Huxley in his detailed description of the workings of a
‘World State’ with five castes (called ‘Alphas,’ ‘Betas,’ ‘Gammas,’ ‘Deltas,’
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and ‘Epsilons’): While the caste vocabulary is shared by all, each caste is sys-
tematically recruited into a ‘Class Consciousness,’ that is, trained to concep-
tualize its own caste as the best and take a dim view of other castes. This is
achieved through training in early infancy, schooling, and relentless propa-
ganda. But Huxley’s most vivid image in this connection is that of
hypnopaedia, the technique whereby people are surreptitiously inducted into
a way of thinking in their sleep, through exposure to messages such as the
following:
Alpha children wear grey. They work much harder than we do, because they’re so frightfully
clever. I’m really awfully glad I’m a Beta, because I don’t work so hard. And then we are much
better than the Gammas and Deltas. Gammas are stupid. (Huxley 1932, pp. 22–23)
Beforemoving on to the next lesson in class consciousness, Huxley tells us,
a beta would have heard this ‘a hundred and twenty times three times a week
for thirty months’ (1932, p. 23). The example is fictional and betrays a dated
and exaggerated belief in the effectiveness of conditioning, but it is a power-
ful metonymic image of state-controlled, surreptitious, and deteriorative
conceptual engineering. Indeed, Huxley himself intended it as a metonymic
image for real forms of ‘tyranny over the mind,’ as he made clear in later es-
says published under that title (Huxley 1958, ch. 10). And what Huxley’s de-
piction of the World State and its all-invading apparatus of mind control
also reminds us of is just how different our social world would have to be
for total control over concepts to become reality.
Once we focus on the darker side of conceptual engineering, it is striking
that historically, many examinations of conceptual engineering were moti-
vated by the fear, which they sought to impress upon their readers, of the
alarming extent to which conceptual engineering can be implemented in a
controlled fashion, especially once the apparatus of the modern state is de-
ployed to this end. Moreover, they bring out how the most effective ways
of controlling conceptual uptake also tend to be those that evade scrutiny:
The dark side of conceptual engineering is dark not just in the sense of being
driven by less benevolent motives, but also in the sense of being harder to
see. A piece of conceptual engineering need not loudly announce itself as
an innovation. It might follow a more clandestine script: People can be ha-
bituated, trained, or coaxed into adopting concepts. Advertising profes-
sionals and spin doctors carefully craft campaigns, videos, and billboards
to this end. And political propagandists have long explored mechanisms
for indoctrinating people, pushing them to toe the party line, instilling dumb
awe at the sight of their ruler, or encouraging the veneration of the regime’s
patriotic soldier-citizens.11 Victor Klemperer, who chronicled the linguistic
means through which the Nazis disseminated their ideology in his The
Language of the Third Reich, describes how insidiously the concept of hero-
ism had been engineered by the Nazi regime:
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What a huge number of concepts and feelings [the language of Nazism] has corrupted and poi-
soned!… I have observed again and again how the young people in all innocence, and despite a
sincere effort to fill the gaps and eliminate the errors in their neglected education, cling to Nazi
thought processes. They don’t realize they are doing it; the remnants of linguistic usage from the
preceding epoch confuse and seduce them. … it was always just round the corner, someone
spoke of some heroic behaviour or other, or of some heroic resistance, or simply heroism per
se. As soon as this concept was even touched upon, everything became blurred, and we were
adrift once again in the fog of Nazism. (Klemperer 2013, pp. 2–3)
To instill this concept of heroism, according to Klemperer, there was no
need for a stipulative definition or an explicit imposition. It was simply that,
for 12 years, the ‘concept and vocabulary of heroism [had] increasingly and
ever more exclusively [been] restricted to military bravery and foolhardy,
death-defying behaviour in some military action or other’ (2013, p. 5).12
The Nazis succeeded in shaping the youth’s concepts not just, and not even
primarily, by explicitly decreeing whom they were allowed to call ‘heroic,’
but by exposing them to an informational universe (newspapers, radio
broadcasts, and school books) in which patriotic soldier-citizens in uniform
were tirelessly elevated by propaganda and hailed as ‘heroes.’
In light of these examples from bleak periods of the past and dystopian vi-
sions of the future, the ‘implementation challenge’ takes on a rather different
hue. While examples of deteriorative engineering render it more plausible
that we could institutionalize the power to control conceptual uptake, they
also render it doubtful that we shouldwant to do so. It should not be too easy
for anyone to engineer people’s concepts, for we have reason to fear what
might come of such power. Conceptual engineers with the power to impose
their favored concepts across all domains of thought are normally found
only in totalitarian states, where rulers dictate how certain words should
be used and can rely on an all-encompassing propaganda and policing appa-
ratus that coercively enforces uptake, censors competing concepts, and gen-
erally treatsminds as ideologicalmodeling clay. This amounts to totalitarian
thought control, in which people are forced to use concepts in conformity
with the whims of the powerful rather than with the facts (as in the dark So-
viet joke about the apparatchik who asks a mathematician ‘How much is
2 + 2?’ and receives the cautious reply ‘How much do you want it to
be?’).13 One cannot institutionalize the power to improve concepts without
thereby also institutionalizing the risk of that power being abused. To pro-
tect the less powerful against such abuses, that power should be carefully
limited.
This line of argument receives succor from Shklar’s ‘liberalism of fear’: the
idea that the historical memory of past abuses of power and control justifies
a liberalism animated by fear of what the powerful might do to the less pow-
erful, and in particular justifies political arrangements designed to secure, for
the less powerful, some measure of freedom from abuse of power and
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control. It is a fear fueled by the expectation –which Shklar takes to be ‘am-
ply justified on every page of political history’ – that ‘some agents of govern-
ment will behave lawlessly and brutally in small or big ways most of the time
unless they are prevented from doing so’ (1989, p. 28).
This yields an intellectually modest justification for a modestly
non-Utopian liberalism. The liberalism of fear makes fewer presuppositions
than a Lockean liberalism of natural rights or a Millian liberalism of per-
sonal development, and its focus lies on damage control rather than on
envisioning the perfect liberal state. It does not assume the existence of nat-
ural rights, or a moralized understanding of individual autonomy and its im-
portance to the good life. All it presupposes is the historical recollection of
the cruelty made possible by differences in power and control.14 And what
the liberalism of fear implies or encourages is not a picture of political life
in which freedom is paramount, but rather a history-fueled suspicion of con-
centrations of power and control, and a corresponding preference for the
separation and dispersion of power and control.15 Onemight say that our ar-
gument explores the consequences for conceptual engineering of accepting
Shklar’s starting point, namely the sense, fueled by her historical awareness
of the failures of past utopian projects, that political organization should pri-
oritize the prevention of the summum malum over the promotion of the
summum bonum, and that we should allow institutions only as much power
as we are willing to risk landing in the wrong hands.
Importantly, this is not simply the idea that we should prefer a weak state
for fear of what a strong one might do in the wrong hands. The liberalism of
fear allows for the possibility that what we have most reason to fear is pre-
cisely a weak state that is impotent to prevent powerful private actors from
taking advantage of less powerful private actors. The basic units of analysis
of the liberalism of fear are not ‘public’ and ‘private,’ but ‘weak’ and ‘pow-
erful’ (Shklar 1989, p. 27). Beyond that, it usefully leaves open what falls into
each category in a given context – the powerful might include international
institutions, private actors, or, indeed, the ideologically influential.16
It might be objected that whether a liberalism-of-fear argument is compel-
ling in this context rests in large part on how one evaluates our current con-
ceptual repertoire. What if conceptual oppression is already rampant? The
very fear of conceptual oppression that is supposed to motivate our making
even ameliorative conceptual engineering difficult to implement would then
in fact be at risk of being realized by our making ameliorative conceptual en-
gineering difficult to implement.17 We can label this the counterproductivity
worry: in a society in which conceptual oppression is already rampant, mak-
ing and keeping engineering challenging to implement appears inherently
counterproductive.
Our response to this counter-productivity worry comes in two parts. To
begin with, we can distinguish between (a) fear of conceptual oppression,
that is, of the concepts at work in society having oppressive and unjust
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effects; and (b) fear of abuses of the power to control conceptual uptake. As
we conceive of the liberalism of fear, it is primarily concerned with (b): the
liberal’s fear is, in the first instance, directed at what the powerful might do
to the powerless, which is why that fear motivates the kind of limitation
and dispersion of power that will make abuses of power less likely. Of
course, this is not to say that the widespread currency of oppressive concepts
is of no concern to the Shklarian liberal. But the liberalism of fear is a theo-
retical lens that focuses attention not so much on specific outcomes as on the
underlying processes and configurations of power that produce them: seen
through this lens, conceptual oppression is merely one product of the abuse
of power, and hardly the worst.
Moreover, insofar as even the Shklarian liberal has reason to eliminate
existing conceptual oppression, institutionalizing control over conceptual
uptake is not a particularly promising strategy: New powers tend to be vul-
nerable to appropriation by the already powerful, and because the already
powerful also tend to be those who benefit from conceptual oppression, they
have incentives to use their new powers to prevent rather than promote con-
ceptual change. And even if they do in fact use their power to successfully
eliminate existing forms of conceptual oppression, the sheer existence of
such a power raises the specter of its being subsequently abused in some
other way. We cannot institutionalize a power that will cut through knotty
politics and impose radical improvements without risking its being put to
other uses. The prospect of a power that will transcend liberal democratic
politics, unencumbered by the need to persuade, never ceases to be tempting;
because any such power is likely to end up being appropriated by the already
powerful or abused by the newly powerful, however, it is a temptation we
have reason to resist.
The liberalism of fear thus provides the first prong of a two-pronged ratio-
nale for making and keeping conceptual uptake hard to control. We should
not want it to be too easy to control people’s concepts for fear of how this
power and control might be used, and we should be wary of concentrations
of that kind of power and control, especially when they are not adequately
checked by countervailing influences. From the point of view of the liberal-
ism of fear, lack of control over people’s concepts then appears as a feature
rather than a flaw, and if the well-intentioned conceptual engineer faces a
formidable implementation challenge, thismay be regrettable from the point
of view of the engineer, but it is at the same time a liberal achievement. As
Shklar notes, ‘No theory that gives public authorities the unconditional right
to impose beliefs and even a vocabulary as they may see fit upon the citi-
zenry can be described as even remotely liberal’ (1989, p. 24).
One might object that the power to impose concepts or ‘a vocabulary’ is
not as threatening, from a liberal point of view, as the power to impose be-
liefs. After all, the imposition of concepts leaves people with one more de-
gree of freedom, because it does not predetermine which beliefs they form
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using the imposed concepts. If the ultimate aim is to instill the belief that x is
F (say, that the government is legitimate), then imposing a certain concept of
legitimacy instead of directly instilling the belief that the government is legit-
imate seems to leave open the possibility of judging that x is not F, that is,
that the government is not legitimate. Control over concepts looks less illib-
eral than control over beliefs. Yet this impression is quickly dispelled once
we consider that a given concept Fmay, as David Wiggins has emphasized,
leave one ‘nothing else to think but that’ x is F.18 A well-designed concept of
legitimacy can be tailored to ensure that for those who use that particular con-
cept of legitimacy in a particular state, the only reasonable conclusion to be
drawn is that the government is in fact legitimate, because it meets all the
criteria for the application of a concept the point of which is to ensure that
this government should meet them. Hence, the power to recruit people into
using certain concepts rather than others can be an effective way of deter-
mining what beliefs they form. Just as there is a liberal rationale for being
wary of the power to control belief formation, therefore, there is a liberal ra-
tionale for being wary of the power to control conceptual uptake.
3.2. THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND THE ENGI-
NEERING OF CONSENT
We come now to the second prong – let us call it the democratic rationale – of
our two-pronged rationale for making and keeping conceptual engineering
hard to implement. At first pass, one might think that handing a democratic
polity the tools to effectively enforce improvements to its conceptual reper-
toire promises to strengthen democracy: it would endow it with the power
to clear out whatever ideological rot menaces its stability.19
There is an inherent incompatibility between democracy and the power ef-
fectively to control conceptual uptake across a society’s conceptual reper-
toire, however. Democracy – let us assume – requires the consent of the
governed. But giving any actor (be it the state, or, in more complex cases,
some private actor such as a corporation) the power to control conceptual
uptake across the board is to give it the power to engineer consent, in partic-
ular by controlling on which concepts of legitimacy that consent turns. And
because engineered consent is not real consent, limiting control over concep-
tual uptake is an essential requirement on genuine democracy.
To substantiate this claim, we can start from the observation that charac-
terizing a conceptual engineering project as ‘ameliorative’ can appear
question-begging. AsMarques (2020) points out, this is particularly so when
the grounds for regarding a piece of engineering as an improvement cannot
in the end remain purely epistemic, the way that Simion (2018) and
Podosky (2018)make themout to be. Even if we accept the idea that we have
pro tanto reasons to use concepts that enable us to articulate knowledge or
truths, it does not follow that we want our conceptual apparatus to enable
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us to articulate any and all truths. In virtue of their needs, values, and inter-
ests, people will find it more worthwhile to articulate certain truths rather
than others, and people with different needs, values, and interests can rea-
sonably disagree over which truths these are.20 Even if we consider the ques-
tion of conceptual amelioration in narrowly epistemic terms, therefore, we
cannot entirely wring the politics out of conceptual engineering. And of
course, once we factor in other significant effects of concepts besides their
truth-conduciveness – their immediate psychological effects in channeling
concept-users’ emotions and attention and prompting their memory and
imagination in certain ways, for instance, but also the variety of more distal
socio-political effects that the concepts’ wider uptake can be expected to
have – people will have all the more room to differ over what they regard
as an ‘ameliorative’ intervention in the conceptual repertoire.
To render these disagreements more analytically tractable, it helps to
think of any concrete proposal for ameliorative conceptual engineering as
having to pass through two choice points concerning its ends and means:
(i) the choice of a goal in the service of which to engineer concepts; and (ii)
the choice of a concept through which to work towards the realization of that
goal. There is room for reasonable disagreement at both choice points. That
people disagree about what goals to pursue is one of the basic facts of poli-
tics. But even where there is agreement on a goal, which concepts in fact con-
stitute the best way to pursue that goal is epistemically opaque in a way that
does not necessarily admit of a clear ex ante answer. Good intentions are one
thing, the actual effects of a proposed concept becoming widespread quite
another. What unintended consequences might the uptake of this concept
have? Howmight the concept be repurposed or abused? Nietzsche’s concep-
tual innovations of thewill to power and theÜbermensch, for example, ended
up being exploited by just the nationalistic and anti-Semitic political move-
ments he abhorred. And even the prima facie benign concept of human rights
has been criticized for helping to legitimate Western interventions in the
post-colonial era (Moyn 2010) and exacerbating global inequality by focus-
ing attention on sufficiency rather than equality (Moyn 2018). Even if we are
confident that a proposed concept is unlikely to prove harmful, moreover,
how do we know that it will promote the agreed goal better than a rival con-
cept? These many layers of epistemic opacity all create room for reasonable
disagreement: people who agree on what goals to pursue may yet reasonably
disagree over what concepts to pursue them with.
The democratic way to handle such disagreements is to treat them not as
purely technical matters to be resolved once and for all through sufficiently
rigorous philosophical scrutiny, but as political matters to be decided
through a political process taking some form of democratic input. One could
have a body of democratically elected representatives vote on how to ame-
liorate the conceptual repertoire, for example. But notice that such a demo-
cratic resolution of disagreements over the means and ends of conceptual
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engineering would not obviously preclude the far-reaching institutionaliza-
tion of control over conceptual uptake: in principle, the democratic body
could hand down its decision to a centralized implementation agency with
the powers necessary to enforce it. This combination of democratic deliber-
ation with centralized implementation would promise to make conceptual
engineering both democratic and easy to implement. If, as we aim to argue
in this section, conceptual engineering that is easy to implement is undemo-
cratic, then, this cannot be because a lack of control over concepts is indis-
pensable to the democratic resolution of disagreements over how to
engineer concepts; for all that our argument has shown thus far, there could
be an implementation agency with formidable enforcement powers that
nonetheless took democratic input.
The point must be, rather, that a society in which a centralized agency can
easily implement conceptual engineering is undemocratic not, or not primar-
ily, because the engineering lacks democratic input, but rather because its
output threatens to erode democracy over time (thereby eventually also
undermining the input’s claim to being genuinely democratic). To see why,
consider a society that combines all the characteristic trappings of demo-
cratic processes of governance and deliberation, such as open elections and
decision-making by majority vote, with a powerful centralized Ministry of
Conceptual Engineering capable of exercising a great deal of control over
which concepts people come to use in any given area of life. The fact that
the power to determine in what terms people conceptualize things rests
largely with a centralized authority imperils the society’s claim to being gen-
uinely democratic; for in virtue of being able to determine inwhat terms peo-
ple think, the government is in a position to cloud and warp people’s
understanding of their own interests, stint their sense of what is possible,
and bias their electoral choices as well as their collective deliberation. The in-
stitutionalization of that kind of power fatally undermines democracy on
just about any conception of it, whether economic, epistemic, or
deliberative.21
The fundamental reason why such a power is incompatible with democ-
racy is that democracy requires the consent of the governed, and the institu-
tionalization of a power capable of fully overcoming the implementation
challenge threatens to turn the consent of the governed from a serious con-
straint on power into a mere product of power. Liberal democracy rests on
the idea that exercises of power have to be discursively justified and are ac-
cepted as legitimate based on reasons.22 If the aspiration to render concep-
tual engineering easy to implement is inimical to democracy, it is because
it raises the threat of this power over concepts being directed towards those
very reasons. Controlling conceptual uptake in general means controlling
through which concepts the governed distinguish between legitimate and il-
legitimate exercises of power. But if the powerful get to determine what
counts as a legitimate or illegitimate exercise of their power, they can
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effectively engineer the legitimacy of any exercise of power whatsoever: legit-
imacy becomes an effect of their power rather than a constraint on it. Con-
ceptual engineering then amounts to what the propaganda and public
relations pioneer Edward Bernays called ‘the engineering of consent’
(1969), and engineered consent is not real consent.23
Seemingly democratic processes of governance and deliberation thus can-
not be genuinely democratic unless the power to determine in what terms
people think is itself democratically distributed across society. If a demo-
cratic body were given the power to exercise full control over conceptual up-
take, the exercise of that power would eventually risk feeding back into the
formation and operation of that body in ways that would undermine its
democratic legitimacy.24 It is because of this deep structural connection be-
tween the freedom of thought and the capacity to provide genuinely demo-
cratic input that institutionalizing control over conceptual uptake erodes
democracy.
Besides a liberal rationale, there is thus also a democratic rationale for lim-
iting control over conceptual uptake. Because of the connection between the
freedom of thought and the capacity to provide genuinely democratic input,
the absence of institutionalized power over conceptual uptake is part of what
makes a society democratic.
Of course, it does not follow that institutionalizing control over concep-
tual uptake is always bad for democracy. As we saw in Section 2, there are
certain professions and domains of thought in which even a democracy
has good reasons to increase control over concepts. Some domains, such
as the legal profession and the health care sector, depend on institutional
structures that ensure the uptake and enforcement of conceptual innova-
tions, because there are strong practical pressures to coordinate on a single
harmonized technical terminology. And while OliverWendell Holmes could
still confidently write that ‘the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas’ and that ‘the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market,’25 the 21st century mar-
ketplace of ideas, with its social media networks and bot farms, makes one
less confident in the capacity of an unregulated ‘marketplace of ideas’ to
converge on the concepts we really want. What if Gresham’s law were to
hold for concepts as well, so that ‘bad’ concepts drive out the ‘good’? Just
as the state has good reasons (e.g., of efficiency and justice) to allocate cer-
tain goods on the basis of non-market principles and to regulate certainmar-
kets, so there are reasons to centralize control over conceptual uptake in the
hands of particular bodies in certain parts of the marketplace of ideas. Noth-
ing about the connection between freedom of thought and democracy entails
that the marketplace of ideas should be entirely unregulated. After all, even
places that traditionally put great emphasis on the protection of freedom of
thought and speech, such as universities and courts of law, regulate who can
speak, who can listen, and when.26
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But even the local institutionalization of control over conceptual uptake
needs to take a certain form if it is to maintain its consonance with demo-
cratic political arrangements. Here it once again becomes important that
ameliorative conceptual engineering is not merely a technical matter, like
clearing a radio channel from static, but allows for reasonable disagreements
over ends and means due to the political nature and epistemic opacity of the
questions involved. This calls for political checks on control.
In liberal democracies, three such political checks are restriction to a do-
main, transparency, and accountability. First, institutionalized control over
conceptual uptake can be confined to associative bodies whose power is nar-
rowly restricted to a particular domain. Second, conceptual engineering
should ideally be transparently declared as such; the contemporary philo-
sophical literature, with its openly revisionist stipulative definitions backed
by reasons to adopt them, tends to reflect that ideal.27 And third, conceptual
engineers with the power to implement their proposed changes should be
held accountable, for instance by democratically organizing the associative
bodies doing the engineering, so that those in charge can be voted out if they
use their power irresponsibly.
These checks also mutually reinforce each other. Restricting control over
conceptual uptake to certain domains helps to secure accountability, for ex-
ample, because it allows those who enjoy a certain control to be accountable
to people that are outside the reach of that control. And beyond those re-
stricted contexts, liberal democratic societies have a strong presumption in
favor of ensuring that concepts openly compete with each other by keeping
control over conceptual uptake limited and diffused.
Of course, that kind of compartmentalization between ‘domains’ where
we accept and institutionalize power and control over conceptual uptake
and domains where we do not require us to draw a line somewhere, and that
carries its own difficulties. The distinction between acceptable and
inacceptable forms of control over conceptual uptake is a species of the dis-
tinction between acceptable and inacceptable forms of persuasion, and artic-
ulating such a distinction in any principled way and at a general level is
notoriously hard. Certainly, the distinction does not simply line up with
the distinction between merely causal force or coercion and the rational
power of reason and argument. For one thing, the latter cannot be cleanly
extricated from the former, as even the purest real-life examples of the power
of reason involve non-rational influences, such as the persuasive power of
charisma. We therefore cannot distinguish acceptable from unacceptable
forms of control over conceptual uptake simply by saying that acceptable
control is control in an Ideal Speech Situation à la Habermas that is
completely free of distortion by power or Herrschaft.28 If we ruled out any
concept whose uptake is partly the effect of someone’s power, there would
be no concepts left to think with.
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Moreover, there are many forms of persuasion through merely causal
forces and even coercion that we are evidently willing to accept. The point
is particularly clear in the case of education. There is a sense in which today’s
education notably involves the implementation of yesterday’s conceptual
engineering: Pupils are taught to think in terms of the concepts developed
or advocated by the previous generation of linguists, mathematicians, histo-
rians, biologists, climate scientists, and so forth. Ideally, their education cul-
minates in the development of the capacity to reflect critically about these
concepts; but this capacity comes later, on the back of having been
enculturated into using these concepts uncritically at first. To this end, edu-
cational institutions are organized to imbue teachers with a considerable
amount of control over pupils’ concepts, and the form that this control takes
is hardly entirely free of coercion. As Bernard Williams observed, ‘[p]upils
enter education, most often, under some kind of coercion, and some of them
stay in it and listen only for those same reasons. If they have a good teacher,
those reasons fall away, but the good teacher will have substituted other
powers of persuasion for those’ (2002, p. 226).
Why do liberal democratic societies characteristically accept this partly
coercive implementation of conceptual engineering for the basic concepts
of geometry and arithmetic, but reject a comparably heavy-handed ap-
proach in politics? Our examination of the ways in which such an approach
would be in tension with the political values of liberalism and democracy of-
fers part of the answer. Restraint in this domain is itself a central expression
of liberal democratic political values. It expresses a wariness of abuses of
power over political concepts such as legitimacy. But it also expresses respect
for pluralism and for the political contestation of the majority will. Liberal
democratic societies characteristically forswear control over political con-
cepts because they take seriously the political significance of respecting peo-
ple’s freedom in conceptualizing political values like legitimacy, equality,
liberty, or justice differently, both from each other and from the state.
Beyond these red lines, however, the tradition of liberal democratic
thought leaves itself fewmeans bywhich to draw a sharp distinction between
good and bad control over conceptual uptake, or between better or worse
concepts. It has some tools, such as the harm principle, but it denies itself ap-
peals to a single, uniquely authoritative (because natural or divinely sanc-
tioned) conceptual scheme. Instead, it aims to construct a framework
within which people can non-violently and respectfully disagree with each
other about which concepts are best, and offers them peaceful ways to re-
solve these disagreements through political processes. It is essential to its be-
ing a democratic disagreement, however, that it should be conducted in an
open forum of rational debate, in which the powers of any one side to imple-
ment its prescriptions are, by definition, limited. Both how we should im-
prove our conceptual repertoire, and which forms of control over
conceptual uptake we are willing to accept, are irreducibly political
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questions. A democracy deserving of the term will accordingly treat these
questions as calling for a democratic input that is itself sufficiently indepen-
dent from power to be an effective constraint on it.
4. Conclusion
The implementation challenge can thus in principle be fully overcome, but
only by going against the very idea of liberal democratic politics. There is
therefore a limit to how far liberal democratic conceptual engineers can con-
sistently regret their lack of control over conceptual uptake. To be sure, the
philosophers framing implementation as a ‘challenge’ and exploring how
that challenge might be overcome are not thereby automatically advocating
the institution of a Ministry of Conceptual Engineering – that is merely a
particularly vivid limiting case. But in venturing down the road of trying
to overcome the implementation challenge, it is helpful to be clear about
what lies at the end of it, and why implementation should seem challenging
to begin with.
While accommodating the fact that some limited amount of control over
conceptual uptake is a good thing in certain contexts, we have sought to
bring out the respects in which the power to implement and enforce concep-
tual engineering, however benevolent in intention and ameliorative in effect,
is inherently inimical to liberal democratic politics. In a liberal democracy,
institutionalized mechanisms facilitating implementation should be limited
to domains that absolutely depend on them for good practical reasons, such
as the legal and medical professions, and absent otherwise. This is not to say
that we should make it impossible to implement conceptual change. It is
only to say that the ideals of liberal democratic politics give us pro tanto rea-
sons to keep conceptual engineering challenging to implement by making it
require persuasion. It is one thing to have people or institutions who claim
the epistemic or moral authority to tell us which concepts to use. It is quite
another for them to have the power to forcibly implement these conceptual
changes. Having the power to prescribe without the power to enforce may
not always be efficient or effective; but this enforcement gap is an essential
feature of liberal democracy. It is a defense against abuses of power and con-
trol, and it acknowledges the political dimension of the question of what
concepts should be promulgated and how.
If we lack control over the implementation of conceptual engineering,
then, it is in no small part because we have made it so, and for good reason.
The liberal fear of the power to control conceptual uptake ending up in the
wrong hands, combined with the democratic demand for freedom of
thought as a precondition of genuine consent, yields a two-pronged liberal
democratic rationale for keeping implementation challenging. Realizing this
does not so much settle the question of how to pursue conceptual
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engineering as open up a broader area of research: If we take seriously the
political significance of concepts, what sorts of institutional mechanisms
for managing concepts are in fact most compatible with given conceptions
of legitimacy, liberty, equality, justice, and other important political values?
That is the fruitful area of intersection between conceptual engineering and
political philosophy that we hope to have staked out for further
investigation.29
Matthieu Queloz
Wolfson College, Oxford, UK
Friedemann Bieber
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
NOTES
1 This is not to say that conceptual analysis lacks political ramifications as long as it limits
itself to describing the status quo – it clearly has such ramifications even then, and the charge that
conceptual analysis’ aspiration to remain above the political fray amounts to a spectatorial con-
servatism is one of the oldest charges against it. Some of the earliest critics to raise it include
Ernest Gellner, Herbert Marcuse, and Lewis Feuer. Refer to Wertheimer (1976) and
Krishnan (Forthcoming) for historical overviews and assessments of this charge.
2 Cited in Berlin (2002, p. 82).
3 A notable exception is Marques (2020).
4 Refer to Cappelen and Plunkett (2020), Deutsch (2020), Koch (2020), Fischer (2020),
Nado (2020), Isaac (2021), Jorem (2021), and Nimtz (2021). How exactly they understand the
implementation challenge of course varies with their particular interests and metasemantic
commitments.
5 A seminal example of this attitude is the treatment of the implementation challenge in
Cappelen (2018, pp. 72; refer also to pp. 73–75, 83–84), who defends what he calls the ‘Inscruta-
ble – Lack of Control – Will Keep Trying’ principle. The suspicion may arise at this point that
skeptics about control have a narrower ‘we’ in mind, and are only making a claim about the in-
dividual or about philosophers, but not about society as a whole. Yet Cappelen is adamant that
his skepticism is insensitive to the scope of the ‘we’ in question (2018, p. 74).
6 For an argument to the effect that Cappelen’s view largely denies us ‘individual immedi-
ate control’ but remains compatible with ‘collective long-range control,’ refer to Koch (2018);
refer also to Pinder (2018, 2019).
7 The analogy is more systematically elaborated in Richard (2019).
8 Refer to Cook and Saccheri (2013).
9 Refer to Marques (2020) and Shields (Forthcoming).
10 In his ‘Politics and the English Language,’Orwell also prefigures present-day engineers in
his insistence that language needs ‘fixing,’ in Cappelen’s (2018) titular phrase. Because ‘the slo-
venliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts’ (Orwell 2008, p. 270),
Orwell argues in that essay, ‘one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the
verbal end’ (2008, p. 286).
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11 Here conceptual engineering productively intersects with the literature on public relations,
manipulation, and propaganda; refer to Bernays (1969); Coons and Weber (2014);
Fischer (2017); Fischer and Illies (2018); Herman and Chomsky (1988); MacLeod (2019);
Mills (1995); Noggle (1996); Rudinow (1978); Stanley (2015, 2018).
12 For more recent analyses of Nazi propaganda, refer to Doherty (2000) and Kallis (2005).
13 Refer to Anderson (1995, p. 27).
14 Refer to Shklar (1989); she expands on the reasons to focus on the cruelty of the powerful
as the summum malum (and not to let ‘ordinary vices’ such as hypocrisy and snobbery distract
from it) in Shklar (1984).
15 Refer to Williams (2005), who writes that the liberalism of fear implies ‘a pluralism of
powerful institutions’ (p. 55). On the liberal rationale for the dispersion of power, see also
Bagg (Forthcoming).
16 As Jan-Werner Müller notes, the liberalism of fear is purposefully open-ended and pur-
posefully leaves the concept of liberty undertheorized; it thereby ‘allows men and women to
be critics, without a fully agreed philosophy and even without a permanent cause’ (Müller 2015,
p. 56).
17 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this line of argument.
18 Refer to Wiggins (1990).
19 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
20 Refer to Queloz (2021, pp. 2, 219–20, 235, 240).
21 Refer to Stanley (2015, pp. 11–12).
22 For elaborations of this point that bring out the crucial role of legitimating concepts in par-
ticular, refer to Cueni and Queloz (2021) and Cueni (2020).
23 For a historical overview of Bernays’ pioneering role in the field of public relations and
propaganda, refer to Tye (1998).
24 A process highlighted notably by Weber (1967, pp. 335–36).
25 Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616 (1919), J. Holmes dissenting, at 630. The context is
Holmes’s defense of the First Amendment. For an assessment of the legal and historical signif-
icance of the case, refer to Healy (2014).
26 Refer to Post (1995) and Williams (2002, p. 217).
27 Although, as Plunkett and Sundell (2013a) emphasize, disagreements over which concepts
to use, although metalinguistic in nature, need not be fought out at the metalinguistic level, but
can be dressed up in first-order language that does not explicitly declare itself as a piece of con-
ceptual engineering. They suggest that such ‘metalinguistic negotiations’ are ubiquitous in ordi-
nary as much as in philosophical settings. Refer also to Plunkett and Sundell (2013b),
Plunkett (2015), and McPherson and Plunkett (2020).
28 Refer to Habermas (1970). Refer to Queloz (2022) for an elaboration of this point.
29 We are grateful toDamianCueni, who offered extremely helpful and detailed feedback on
an earlier draft. We are also indebted to two anonymous referees for their exceptionally con-
structive comments, which greatly improved the paper. A first draft was presented at theUniver-
sity of Zurich, and we are grateful to Constantine Sandis, Nicole Rathgeb, Krystina Schaub,
Michel Meliopoulos, Fionn O’Donovan, and other discussants on that occasion. We are also
grateful to the Swiss National Science Foundation for its generous support.
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